

Understanding Behavior in Japan's Academic Marketplace¹

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IN recent years, several empirically based studies of blue collar and white collar Japanese workers—notably by Taira, Hazama, Marsh and Mannari, Cole, and Evans—have resulted in a substantial “revision” of our understanding of Japanese labor markets.² These studies have disputed previous claims that Japanese workers commit themselves irrevocably to their employers and have shown that familiar economic and non-economic incentives affect marketplace behavior. Moreover, while these studies recognize the importance of paternalistic practices in shaping employment relations, they prove that these practices are not simple reflections of traditional values.

In this paper, we wish to adopt the insights of this revisionist literature to a consideration of Japan's academic marketplace. To support our argument, we will present several tables with empirical findings from government documents and from two surveys we conducted of university professors. These are a Representative Survey of 805 scholars conducted in 1967 and a survey of 220 recently Mobile Men conducted in 1971.³

Much of the academic gossip in Japan focuses on the powerful professors at leading universities who are said to control the rest of academia just as Grand Masters

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¹ This article is based on research conducted between 1967–1971 and reported in William K. Cummings, *The Changing Academic Marketplace and University Reform in Japan*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1972. A Japanese translation by Iwauchi Ryōichi and Tomoda Yasumasa titled *Nihon no Daigaku Kyōju* was published by Shiseido Press in 1972. I would like to thank Mr. Iwauchi and Mr. Tomoda along with Ikado Fujio, Nagai Michio, Gerald Platt, Shinbori Michiya, Tominaga Kenichi, Ezra Vogel, and Donald Wheeler for their help at various stages in the research. Financial support from the National Science Foundation and the National Institute of Mental Health is also gratefully acknowledged.

² Hazama Hiroshi, *Nihon Rōmu Kanrishi Kenkyū* (Studies in the History of Japanese Labor and Management Relations) (Tokyo: Daiamondosha, 1964); Koji Taira, *Economic Development and the Labor Market in Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Robert Marsh and Hiroshi

Mannari, “Lifetime Commitment in Japan: Roles, Norms, and Values,” *American Journal of Sociology*, 76, 5 (March, 1971), pp. 795–812; Robert Cole, *Japanese Blue Collar* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); and Robert Evans, Jr., *The Labor Economies of Japan and the United States* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971).

³ The Representative Study was conducted in 1967 and used a two-stage random sample design to obtain a representative sample of university scholars of the rank of lecturer or above (assistants excluded); 805 scholars (56 per cent of the sample and closely matching the population in terms of type of university, rank, age, and field) returned usable questionnaires detailing their careers and attitudes concerning a wide variety of university activities. The Mobile Man Study of 1971 was directed to a randomly selected sample of 500 scholars who had in the previous five years joined any one of twenty-two universities selected to represent the full diversity of Japanese four-year universities; 220 finally returned the questionnaire for a corrected response rate of 44 per cent with poor cooperation at three of the selected institutions.

control the pawns on a chessboard. The power of these bosses and the compliance of their disciples is said to stem from the conformity of all to traditional Japanese values. Usually the control of bosses is brought up in the context of casual conversations about the move of a particular scholar or the inability of another to gain proper recognition. However, some serious students of the organization of Japanese higher education have attempted to generalize from these tales and develop explanations for the supposedly unusual features of behavior in Japan's academic marketplace—the extensive inbreeding, the colonial status of many lesser universities vis-à-vis particular leading universities, and the low incidence of mobility between institutions. We will review these explanations in some detail below; they consist of two varieties—the simple versions which view marketplace behavior to be a function of the conformity of scholars to the traditional values that legitimate bossism and the sophisticated versions which, in addition to discussing bosses, include traditional structures as an additional factor.

While the traditional approaches provide an important insight on the marketplace, our primary concern is to present a more inclusive labor market approach. The major addition of this approach is its claim that scholars and employers actively engage in market transactions motivated by their desires to improve their respective situations—these additions prove to be useful in accounting for certain patterns of behavior that the traditional approaches have no explanation for:

(1) The labor market approach provides a way of accounting for changes in the incidence of mobility and inbreeding over time (both increases and decreases) whereas, at best, the traditional approaches predict unidirectional changes accompanying the weakening of tradition.

(2) The labor market approach enables us to account for differences in the incidence of mobility and inbreeding which occur in different strata of the system: for example, it predicts correctly that professors at high quality universities in Japan will have relatively less varied careers than those at other institutions whereas the traditional approaches, if stretched to make any statement on the issue, predict the opposite.

(3) Finally the labor market approach enables us to provide a plausible argument for differences in the incidence of mobility and inbreeding between Japan and other academic systems, whereas the traditional approaches by stressing Japan's "Uniqueness" are not congenial to comparisons.

The principle contrasts between these respective approaches are suggested by their constituent variables as presented in Table One. The remainder of this study will contrast their logic.

"Revisionist" arguments concerning behavior in the markets for blue collar and white collar workers have gained acceptance. However, this paper presents the first attempt to extend the labor market approach to the university. Many readers may consider the market for university teachers an exception; indeed, in Japan such claims have often been made. Sunao Ogose has claimed that relations between scholars in the university are even more feudal than those in the *Sumō* stables. He goes on to note:

In *Sumō*, even though the structure of relations among wrestlers is feudal in character, the wrestler who fails to win cannot become a grand champion (*Yokozuna*). However, in the university actual performance is far less important for advance-

TABLE I—DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THREE APPROACHES USED IN ACCOUNTING FOR LABOR MARKET BEHAVIOR

Variables Included	Traditional Approach	Structural Specifications of Traditional Approach	Labor Market Approach
Culture	Unchanging Values of Particularistic Groupism, Loyalty, Hierarchy, and Obedience	Same as traditional	Traditional Values Insofar as they retain their legitimacy; at the same time, a valuation of Rationality and Academic Standards
Secondary Group Structures	Universities viewed as neutral territories where bosses place their disciples	Neutral Universities, Norms of the Hierarchical Chair, Lifetime Employment, and Seniority which were intentional specifications of Japanese Values	Traditional norms plus a Procedure for evaluating academic quality of candidates, and a procedure for bargaining with respect to salaries and other valued resources and some formal means of circulating information on market opportunities
Primary Group	All academics are members of one and only one clique, and are obedient to that clique's boss	Same as traditional	Scholars have ties with their Academic Clique and Boss, as well as with many other individuals and organizations outside the clique; some of these ties are outside their institution and even outside their field. These Contacts are important sources of information on jobs
Economic Resources	Irrelevant	Irrelevant	Salary differentials, cost of moving and other allowances, pension schemes
Non-Economic Resources	Irrelevant	Irrelevant	Labor, leisure, schools for children, prestige, working conditions, atmosphere, location
Personality	Modal Japanese personality which conforms with dictates of boss	Same as traditional	Modal Japanese personality, while at the same time having a significant desire to maximize personal interest

ment; rather one's relation to the boss (*oyabun*) in one's academic clique is the critical determinant of one's career. I doubt if there is any other sector of Japanese society where performance is of such little importance in getting ahead.⁴

Such sentiments are quite strong among Japanese scholars, especially the younger generation, whom many of the readers of this study will have had a chance to meet. These acquaintances will in all likelihood have established some resistance to an approach which suggests that bosses and tradition are not the keys to marketplace behavior. Let it be made clear at the outset that the labor market approach does not deny the presence of bosses or their importance. It simply suggests that other factors are also important. Without even considering the more technical aspects of the labor market approach, a consideration of recent changes in Japanese higher education should illustrate this point.

The Changing Marketplace

For one, the academic marketplace has increased vastly in scale, especially since World War II. Nine years after the Meiji restoration, several of the old bakufu educational institutions were consolidated to establish the University of Tokyo as Japan's first official university. This institution, considerably modified in 1886 and renamed the Imperial University, became the principal model for the growing number of colleges and universities established over the next decades as well as the trainer of a large proportion of their staff. The University Ordinance of 1918 considerably liberalized the requirements for the establishment of universities and the postwar reforms of the American occupation removed further obstacles to university establishment. Figure one illustrates the rapid increase in universities and other institutions of higher education that followed these two reforms; of special interest is the rapid postwar surge in the number of private institutions. Today Japan has more institutions of higher education than all other nations except the U.S.A., India, and the Soviet Union, and a higher proportion of students in the college age cohort than any nation except the U.S. Moreover, there are some 100,000 full-time teachers in institutions of higher education compared with 15,000 at the end of World War II.⁵

When the university system was small, bosses could operate efficiently and with a minimum of competition. However, with growth new centers for the training of scholars and new possibilities for employment have emerged. In the prewar period less than a dozen universities provided training for university level teaching, whereas 78 institutions had graduate schools in 1959; by 1969 the figure had more than doubled to 175.⁶ Many of the new graduate schools are successfully placing at least a few of their students in positions that would have earlier been filled by products of the leading graduate schools.

⁴ Ogose Sunao, "Furui Kenkyūsei o Daha Seyo" (Let's Tear Down the Outdated Research System), *Asahi Jānaru*, VIII, No. 30 (July, 1966), p. 60.

⁵ For an interesting interpretive history of Japanese higher education, see Nagai Michio, *Higher Education in Japan: Its Take-off and Crash*. Jerry Dusenbury, trans. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo

Press, 1971). The statistics for Figure 1 and the text are taken from Ministry of Education, *Education in 1968-70: Japan* (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance Printing Office, 1971) and Ministry of Education, *Educational Standards in Japan* (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance Printing Office, 1971).

⁶ *Educational Standards*, p. 35.




FIGURE 1. Growth in the Number of Institutions of Higher Education (IHE) and Universities

Another important trend has been the growth of the private sector.⁷ During the prewar period, national universities employed the majority of scholars paying them within the framework of national laws for civil servant compensation. Private in-

⁷ Two recent discussions in English of the private sector are William K. Cummings, "The Japanese Private University," *Minerva*, XI, 3 (July, 1973), pp. 348-371; and T. J. Pempel, "The Politics of

Enrollment Expansion in Japanese Universities," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXXIII, 1 (November, 1973), pp. 67-86.

stitutions were a minority and poorly financed; nevertheless, in the postwar period the private sector has expanded rapidly in scale. Today they employ over half the university teachers and provide places for nearly four-fifths of the students. Much of this expansion was the result of a desperate effort to expand revenues, and resulted in alarming increases in student-teacher ratios. While the educational consequences are suspect, these strategies enabled private institutions to match the salaries offered at national institutions. Substantial government aid to private universities especially since 1970 (by 1973 this aid amounted to 17 per cent of the operating expenses of all private universities)⁸ has created a recent situation where many private universities are able to compete on a better than equal basis with national universities. Some of the newest private universities—for example, Sōka Daigaku, established by the Sōka Gakkai, and six new private medical and dental schools—are generously funded and thus can offer better salaries than national universities as well as customized research facilities. Also several of the older private universities such as Sophia, Nihon, and Seikei have demonstrated remarkable ingenuity in recruiting drives, stealing top scholars in mid-career from the leading national universities. Thus, the growth of the private sector is beginning to inject a new competitive spirit into the marketplace.

The growth of competition has reduced the effectiveness of bosses in placing their students. To some extent, strains were evident by the end of World War II as evidenced in the many vocal expressions at that time against the feudal character of universities. The Occupation government encouraged this criticism as part of its democratization program and attempted to introduce reforms which would weaken the power of bosses. For example, the abolition of chairs was proposed. But these early reform efforts had little effect.

However, since that time, partly as an adaptation to the declining boss system, many universities have turned recruiting over to personnel committees and have allowed junior faculty to participate in the formal decisions on candidates made by the faculty meetings. In a 1971 survey of scholars, 62 per cent said they would approve and an additional 25 per cent said they would conditionally approve changes which would open the competition for academic posts and increase the mobility between institutions.⁹

The student revolt gave added impetus to this trend; for in the subsequent reform discussions, conditions of academic employment received a surprising amount of attention. For example, the Association of National Universities in one of its principal reports stated:

To break up the common evils of in-groupishness and self complacency in national universities, it is necessary to change the way in which professors are employed. In the past when universities have employed and promoted staff, they have not con-

⁸ This information was supplied by Tokoyama Tsunesaburō, President of the Private School Promotion Foundation, in a private conversation. For additional evidence on the improvements by Japan's leading independent student of private university fiscal matters, see Ogata Ken, "Shiritsu Daigaku Kyōshokuin no Nenkin Jyōtai: 1972 Nendo Zemi Chōsa Kara" (The Annual incomes of Private University Staff: Based on a Survey by a Seminar),

Keizai Shirin, Vol. 41, 2 (April, 1973), pp. 1-36.

⁹ This survey titled *Daigaku Seido no Kaihaku ni Kansuru Ankēto* (Questionnaire on University Reform) was distributed in 1969 by the Central Council for Education to all of Japan's university professors. The return rate was only 23 per cent, but reasonably distributed by type of university and field. The results were supplied by the Ministry of Education.

sidered a wide number of candidates (but rather have tended to limit their consideration to former alumni) nor have they been truly objective in their evaluation of the ability of those they considered. It is necessary to become more objective in the evaluation of the ability of scholars. In order to break up the isolationism of Japan's universities, inter-university mobility needs to be promoted. . . . Universities should make public announcements that they are searching for new staff and should review candidates from among qualified people working at other universities, non-academic organizations, and other places as well as from among their own ranks.¹⁰

The Central Council for Education in its final Recommendation to the Minister of Education charged that "both educational and research activities have stagnated as a result of the inbreeding of staff and because of lack of staff mobility."¹¹ Even reports from major business associations condemned the employment system at universities and advocated the abolition of the chair and the promotion of talent.

Thus, a mood has been developing among those concerned with Japanese higher education which favors a more dynamic market. In addition several reforms may be implemented (for example, differential salary scales by field within the national system, the transformation of some national universities into public corporations with their independent salary scales, the development of a common retirement benefits system for scholars in both the public and private sectors) which will tend to undermine the boss system and guarantee a market place where exchanges of resources play an increasingly important role.

Immobility and Inbreeding in Comparative Perspective

Japanese higher education's supposedly low rates of academic mobility and high rates of institutional inbreeding are the patterns of behavior which originally inspired the traditional approach. Michiya Shinbori provided the first empirical evidence with his study of the careers of elite professors in several western countries and Japan. In this study he found that Japan's elite scholars had studied and worked at fewer places than their Western counterparts (Table 2c, d, f, g) and that a greater proportion worked only at their alma mater (Table 2e).

Shinbori's study was based on elite samples. Elite scholars are highly visible, and our images of marketplace behavior are often shaped by what we know of their careers. However, the average scholar's career does not necessarily resemble the elite pattern. In the case of Japan, this is immediately obvious through a comparison of the career experiences of Shinbori's 1962 elite sample and our 1967 Representative Scholar sample as summarized in the last column of Table 2. Though the average age of scholars in the Representative Sample is twelve years less, their careers are more diverse in several respects: they are more likely to have worked at two or more universities; they are more likely to have studied at more than one institution; and they are less likely to have worked at any institution where they have studied. In

¹⁰ Kokuritsu Daigaku Kyōkai Daigaku Unei Kyōgikai (Committee on University Administration of the Association of National Universities), *Daigaku Mondai ni Kansuru Chōsa Kenkyū Hōkokusho* (Report of Investigation on University Problems) (Tokyo: Kokuritsu Daigaku Kyōkai, June, 1971),

pp. 16-17.

¹¹ Chūō Kyōiku Shingikai (Central Council for Education), *Kyōiku Kaihaku no tame no Kihonteki Shisaku* (Basic Policy for the Reform of the Educational System) (Tokyo: Monbushō, June, 1971), pp. 68-69.

TABLE 2—INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF CAREER PATTERNS OF PROFESSORS

	Country and Sample					
	France Elite	Germany Elite	U.K. Elite	U.S.A. Elite	Japan Elite	Japan Representative
(a) Sample Size	100	100	100	200	500	805
(b) Average Age of Sample	60.5	60.9	58.5	60.8	58.3	46.5
(c) Average Number of Places Studied	1.9	2.4	1.7	2.5	1.2	1.5
(d) Proportion Who Have Worked at Only One Workplace	6.0%	5.0%	8.0%	11.5%	37.3%	34.0%
(e) Proportion Who Have Worked Only at Their Alma Mater	5.0%	4.0%	5.0%	6.5%	25.4%	21.7%
(f) Average Number of Universities Worked at	3.2	3.0	2.5	2.6	1.5	1.6
(g) Total Number of Workplaces	4.0	3.7	3.7	3.5	2.7	2.2

Sources: Michiya Shinbori, "Comparative Study of Career Patterns of College Professors," *International Review of Education*, 1964, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 284-96; and 1967 Representative Study.

one respect, the scholars of the representative sample have had less experience—fewer have worked outside of higher education—but this can be attributed to their relative youth and the fact that their careers have largely occurred during the stable postwar period.

This comparison of the Japanese elite and representative samples points to the need, where possible, of checking conclusions based on elite studies with results from broader samples. We have a few such results for Western academic marketplaces, and these indicate that Japanese marketplace behavior is not as exceptional as often assumed. For example, concerning mobility, we discover that a representative sample of American scholars have worked at an average of 2.2 places, and a representative sample of British scholars have worked at an average of only 1.5 places.¹² Both these figures are less than for the elite samples of these nations and much closer to the Japanese representative sample's figures. Indeed, British scholars had worked at an average of 0.1 less places than their Japanese counterparts.

The tendency of inbreeding is quite marked in Japan's most distinguished universities. For example, in 1970, 96 per cent of the staff at Tokyo University, 88 per cent at Kyoto University, 87 per cent at Waseda University and 84 per cent at Keio

¹² The American figures are from unpublished data supplied by Talcott Parsons and Gerald Platt in connection with their ongoing study of the American academic profession. The British figures are from A. H. Halsey and M. A. Trow, *The British Academics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 225ff. The reader may have observed that British elite scholars are more mobile than "average" scholars, American elite

scholars are about as mobile as "average" scholars, and Japanese elite scholars are less mobile than "average" Japanese scholars. Given different age distributions, definitions of universes, and measurement errors these differences may not reflect the real situation. However, they are plausible when we consider the different structures of the respective marketplaces, a task touched on later in this paper.

University were inbred.¹³ Using our classification of university quality, we found that 77 per cent of the scholars in Japan's high quality universities were inbred, and considering scholars at all quality levels 34 per cent were inbred (See Table 6).

Figures from the British study suggest that inbreeding is as common in the United Kingdom as in Japan. Forty-seven per cent of all the university professors there are inbred, and at Oxford and Cambridge (comparable in function to Kyoto University and the University of Tokyo) 78 per cent are inbred. Figures for other European systems have not been published.¹⁴ However, we understand from informal sources that the situation in most of these nations is closer to that in Great Britain than in the U.S.

Berelson found that 47 per cent of American scholars at high quality institutions were inbred, and considering all scholars 15 per cent were inbred. While fewer American than Japanese scholars are inbred, it is interesting that the pattern of a greater frequency of inbreeding at the highest quality institutions is the same in both systems.¹⁵

In considering marketplace behavior, the most meaningful comparative contrast may be between the United States with its high mobility and modest inbreeding and other nations including Japan. A few of Japan's greatest universities are no doubt more inbred and the average Japanese scholar is somewhat less mobile than his European colleague, and these facts deserve explanation. But they are only differences of degree.

*The Traditional Approach*¹⁶

That Japanese marketplace behavior is not exceptional in these respects naturally raises a question about the need for a special Japanese explanation. But before we can deal with this matter, we need to know more about this special Japanese explanation—first we will consider the version which emphasizes the role of academic bosses. This approach begins with the assumption that Japanese society had developed by the later Tokugawa period a relatively well integrated value system with emphasis on particularistic groupism, hierarchy, loyalty, and obedience among other components.¹⁷ These values were peculiar to Japan and presumably remained essentially

¹³ Calculated from *Zenkoiku Daigaku Shokuin-roku* (Tokyo: Kōjūsha, 1970).

¹⁴ Halsey and Trow, *op. cit.* It should be noted that the Japanese sample does not include the lowest ranking staff (assistants) whereas the English sample does include assistant lecturers and "others" (a term that is not defined but probably refers to some low-ranking tutors) and a 28 per cent number of those trained elsewhere who work at Oxbridge occupy these two low rank positions whereas only 11 per cent of those trained at Oxbridge and now employed at Oxbridge hold these positions.

¹⁵ Bernard Berelson, *Graduate Education in the United States* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), pp. 115-116.

¹⁶ Examples of the traditional approach to the academic marketplace are Ogose Sunao, "Furui Kenkyūsei o Daha Seyo," *op. cit.*, 53-66; Shinbōri Michiya, *Nihon No Daigaku Kyōkyū Shijō* (The

Japanese Academic Marketplace), (Tokyo: Tōyōkan Shuppansha, 1964); and Nakane Chie, *Japanese Society* (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1970). We have tried to distill the arguments of these and other researchers in a coherent synthesis: no doubt, specific features of each of the respective arguments may be somewhat misrepresented, but hopefully the spirit of these arguments is reflected in our synthesis. The classic example in English of the traditional approach applied to blue collar markets is James C. Abegglen, *The Japanese Factory* (New York: Free Press, 1958).

¹⁷ We borrow this constellation of Japan's traditional values from Robert N. Bellah and from Nakane Chie, *op. cit.*, whom Bellah relies on; see Bellah, "Continuity and Change in Japanese Society," in Bernard Barber and Alex Inkeles, eds., *Stability and Social Change* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1971), especially page 382.

stable over the modern century. As the traditional values became institutionalized in the newly developing university system, they shaped the relations within this system into a unique Japanese pattern.

Initially, there was only one Japanese university, the Imperial University at Tokyo. The first generation of teachers were foreigners brought on short-time contracts, and the second generation of teachers at this institution were the best native students of the foreigners. These first Japanese professors became the trainers of their successors as well as of the first generation of teachers at each newly established institution. For example, virtually all of the initial staff at Kyoto Imperial University, founded in 1897, were students of professors at the Imperial University at Tokyo.

Thus the professors of the original Imperial University were the certifiers of virtually all the early members of the academic profession. These Imperial University professors occupied a strategic position which they could use to their advantage in establishing personal cliques. A student seeking a job required certification and thus was dependent on his professors: the receipt of a degree, being through the graces of his professor, left the student with a debt which he would acknowledge by becoming a disciple (*deshi*).

As a disciple the student became a member of his professor's clique along with others who all were loyal and obedient to the professor's various wishes. Membership in the clique was not without its advantages. As Nakane Chie observes, "a grouping of this nature . . . serves as a protection of the weaker, who might be forgotten or unproductive if forced back solely on their own resources."¹⁸ Also there were disadvantages for some of the members; some failed to get recognition equal to the contributions they made to clique activity. But the balance of these advantages and disadvantages for individuals is not a problem of importance in the traditional explanation. Participation in such cliques, regardless of the personal consequences, is expected behavior.

In order to repay obligations to their professors, the disciples who moved out to occupy positions at the newly developing universities consented to various requests of their professors such as participation in research projects, acceptance of other of their professors' students for new posts that opened, and so on. Because the bosses at the Imperial University were anxious to find additional places for their students, they obtained exclusive rights to provide the departments of their disciples with all additional new staff—in effect, these departments became the professors' *colonies*.

From this early stage, the academic system increased in size and complexity. As lesser institutions such as Kyoto Imperial University gained in stature, the professors there, one by one, decided to break with their former teachers in Tokyo and became leaders of their own cliques. Given the late start, they could not gain the prominence of their Tokyo rivals, but within their regional area they were able to establish sizeable cliques and create their own colonies. Similar differentiations were to appear throughout the system over time, and in fact the events surrounding their formation can be pointed to in certain instances.¹⁹ However, the basic principles

¹⁸ Nakane, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

¹⁹ Shinbōri, *op. cit.*, provides us with a fascinating statistical account of this process. On page 94 he presents a table showing the regional differentia-

tion of different academic cliques—Tokyo in the Kantō area, Kyoto in the Kansai, Hiroshima in Chūgoku and Shikoku, Kyūshū in Kyūshū, Hokkaidō in Hokkaidō, and Tōhoku in Tōhoku.

of human relations remained unchanged, implanted in each new clique at its conception.

This proliferation of academic cliques is said to be peculiar to Japan. Moreover, bosses are viewed as a vital element in the management of these cliques, just as bosses or *oyakata* are essential elsewhere in Japanese social structure—as leaders of *dekasegi* groups, as the controllers of political favor, and as the heads of gangs. Given the nature of the Japanese personality, transactions presumably can not occur without bosses occupying these strategic positions. The senior professors are not accused of “taking advantage of their position” to exploit clique members. Rather, the professors are said to become bosses because it is expected of them. They gain little from it; it takes an extraordinary amount of their time. Finally it is often emphasized that a good boss is fair in his evaluation of disciples, and constantly concerned for their well-being.

The Consequences of the Boss System

Because of the boss system, the criteria of academic background and connections are said to be unusually important in the recruitment of scholars in Japan. The supposed result of boss control over appointments is that the universities where the bosses work become inbred, and those that they develop by placing their clique members, become colonized.

Furthermore, it is said that the boss system is a factor in the low mobility of Japanese scholars. A typical boss' sphere of influence is confined to a small number of nearby institutions. The bosses are content when they can place their charges in a decent workplace, but see little point in random shufflings. Young scholars find difficulty in moving without the sponsorship of their boss because all positions not owned by their boss are owned by unfriendly bosses. When an attractive post opens, a boss may move an outstanding young clique member into it. At the same time several other clique members may get moved up to an institution one notch higher in prestige than their last (*taraimawashi*—or pass the bucket). But attractive positions are a small proportion of all positions, and are vacated only infrequently.

A Weak and Not Very Unique Boss System

The above is a reasonable summary of the way many have pictured Japan's academic marketplace. It implies that Japan's most intelligent and well-educated adults conform to and surrender their autonomy to their bosses and ignore monetary and other incentives that are outside their bosses' control. Few who describe a Western academic marketplace make such selfless assumptions about the motivations of scholars. Indeed, several of the pictures we have of Western marketplaces describe scholars as greedy, avaricious, ambitious, and relentlessly independent in their search for fame and fortune.²⁰

Frankly, we doubt that the Japanese marketplace is so unusual. In our research, we found many instances where scholars made market decisions without ever seeking the advice of their boss—though they usually sought his approval of the *fait accompli*. In this respect, the scholars were like modern Japanese couples who choose each

²⁰ In particular, Pierre Van den Berghe, *Academic Gamemanship: How to Make a Ph.D. Pay* (New York: Abelard-Schulman, 1970); also see

F. M. Cornford, *Microcosmographia Academica; Being a Guide for the Young Academic Politician* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945).

other and then create the form of an arranged marriage in order to show respect for their parents. In Table 3 we report some evidence on the persons recently mobile scholars said had been most instrumental in securing their new position. Assistants were most likely to say that their bosses had helped them find their recent job. For the higher ranks, a greater proportion of the scholars indicated that others had provided the essential help. Often the "others" had some relation to the respondent's academic clique. However, a "research friend" or "academic society friend" outside of the clique was mentioned as important by nearly two-fifths of the respondents; another category frequently mentioned was "contact in employing institution" who also was often outside of the scholar's clique. It would be impossible to obtain a precise measure of the influence of bosses in personnel decisions, but at least from this data we learn that people other than bosses in a large number of cases play important roles in market transactions.

When mobile scholars were asked what attracted them to their new institutions, most were quite specific about its particular advantages relative to their former institution. One fifth of the mobile men indicated that they had two or more openings to choose from when they moved to their present workplace. And nearly one fifth said they had bargained with their employers before accepting their new jobs. In many instances the bargains were over relatively modest items such as salary rank, retirement benefits, or courses to be taught. However, in several instances the stakes were more substantial. For example, a biochemist accepted a position at a new private medical university on the condition that a laboratory be constructed and equipped according to his specifications, including an expensive electron microscope. A social psychologist moved up to a former Imperial University after being promised a special observation room for studying small group processes. In that a large minority of mobile scholars in Japan are returning to their alma mater, one fifth is a large proportion to be bargaining. A survey of mobile professors in the United States

TABLE 3—PROPORTION OF MOBILE MEN BY RANK WHO RECEIVE HELP FROM THEIR CONNECTIONS

Connections Assisting Mobile Men*	Proportion Receiving Help			
	Mobile Professors	Mobile Asst. Prof.-Lecturer	Mobile Assistant	Total
Chief Professors of Graduate School Important	17.9% (12)	49.5% (46)	62.1% (18)	40.2% (76)
"Senpai" Important	23.9% (16)	23.7% (22)	20.7% (6)	23.3% (44)
Research Friend Important	13.4% (9)	15.1% (14)	20.7% (6)	15.3% (29)
Academic Society Friend Important	25.4% (17)	25.8% (24)	10.2% (3)	23.3% (44)
Contact in Employing Institution Important	50.7% (34)	59.2% (55)	34.5% (10)	52.4% (99)
Total Number of Respondents	(67)	(93)	(29)	(189)

Source: 1971 Mobile Man Study

* Respondents frequently mentioned more than one connection that assisted them.

suggested that only about one in four engaged in bargaining.²¹ While this survey provides no indication, possibly more of the Americans bargain over substantial issues. Also, neither the Japanese or American surveys investigate the extent of bargaining by non-mobile scholars, and we know that Americans often bargain on an individual basis with their superiors in order to obtain concessions at their workplace. Such behavior is rare in Japan. On the other hand, it is possible that Japanese scholars achieve somewhat the same results through the activities of their academic unions (found at the majority of Japanese institutions) which bargain for salary and benefit gains for the faculty at large. The different institutional frameworks of the two systems prevent strict comparisons; however, it is clear that many Japanese scholars are just as concerned as their American colleagues with improving the terms of exchange for their work.

On the side of employers we obtained a ranking of the criteria actually used in recent evaluations of candidates.²² Over 90 per cent of the respondents indicated that ability as indicated by research promise and performance was the most important criterion. Particularistic criteria were rarely mentioned—but then given the embarrassment many feel concerning these criteria we could not expect very frank answers on this question. Even if the answers conceal a substantial amount of particularism, it should not be assumed that such criteria and the related phenomena of bossism and cliques are peculiar to Japan. Terry and Priscilla Clark have described the French patrons, Burton Clark writes of Italy's *il baroni*, Alvin Gouldner has discussed America's empire builders, and Caplow and McGee find lords of the mountain fief and other awesome figures in the American academic marketplace.²³ Also in these and other studies of Western marketplaces, we find reference to academic nepotism, the old boy system, and other names for clique structures.

From these various pieces of information, we are left with a sense that the traditional approach's claim about the dominance of bosses in the Japanese marketplace is an exaggeration. At the same time, it is clear that Western marketplaces are far from pure exhibits of universalism and economic rationality. There are more similarities in the behavior of Japanese and Western academic marketplaces than advocates of the traditional approach recognize.

Traditional Structures as a Substitute Approach

Traditional values as mediated through the actions of bosses and their cliques are not sufficient to explain what goes on in today's academic marketplace. Scholars do exercise some initiative in seeking jobs, and it is apparent that many institutions hire scholars with relatively little deference to the wishes of bosses. While the simple version of the traditional approach is insufficient, a more sophisticated version pro-

²¹ Theodore Caplow and Reece J. McGee, *The Academic Marketplace* (Garden City, N.J.: Anchor Books, 1965), p. 117.

²² Cummings, *Marketplace*, p. 309.

²³ On France, Terry N. Clark and Priscilla P. Clark, "Le Patron et son cercle; clef de l'Université française," *Revue Française de Sociologie*, XII (1971), pp. 19-39. On Italy, communication from Burton R. Clark as well as Barbara B. Burn, *The Emerging System of Higher Education in Italy*, Conference Report No. 1 (New York: Interna-

tional Council for Educational Development 1973). On Belgium, see Renee C. Fox, "Medical Scientists in a Chateau," *Science*, Vol. 136 (1962), pp. 476-83. On the U.S., Alvin Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles—II," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, II (March, 1958), pp. 444-80 and Caplow and McGee, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-69.

posed by Michiya Shinbori overcomes many of its difficulties.²⁴ In the sophisticated version, it is pointed out that Japanese higher education at its inception developed certain unique structures which have persisted unto this day, and these structures have the same effects on behavior as the boss system was claimed to have; they support the boss system forcing Japan's scholars to do what the bosses would like them to do, even without the bosses necessarily issuing commands. These structures are said to have been institutionalized because of their "fit" with traditional Japanese values. The structural specifications of Japanese values are the academic chair, lifetime employment, and the seniority system.

Shinbori argues that these structures as developed in Japan combine to limit the number of candidates screened for positions at universities, and to guarantee that those candidates who do obtain positions have the freedom to stay at their first place of employment for their entire life. At the best universities, due to academic cliques, the screening is limited to alumni. Thus alumni get inbred into the best institutions and because of the norm of lifetime employment they never leave. As no vacancies occur at these attractive institutions, there is no mobility into these institutions. Furthermore, as these are the only institutions that most scholars would be willing to move to and no vacancies open at these institutions, there is very little mobility throughout the marketplace.

Shinbori's observations concerning the effects of these structures on marketplace behavior are essentially correct and constitute a significant addition to our understanding. However, before we conclude that Shinbori is actually elaborating the traditional explanation, we need to ask whether these structures are peculiarly Japanese. Insofar as the structures are unique specifications of Japanese values, Shinbori has revitalized the traditional approach. On the other hand, if we can show that the relation of these structures to traditional Japanese values is problematic then we can feel free to incorporate them in the more inclusive labor market approach.

Of the structures mentioned by Shinbori, Japan's chair system is the most unusual. Academic chairs are a standard organizational feature of most European universities, and of several of the more distinguished American institutions. When Japan decided to build its first Imperial University in the 1880's, the Western concept of the academic chair—especially the French and German versions—was intentionally studied as a possible basic organizational unit for the new institution.²⁵ However, the Japanese planners modified the structure of the chair in a novel way. Academic chairs in the West referred to specially endowed or supported positions for full professors: in some cases the amount of support for the chair enabled the professor to employ assistants under him, but there was no general rule in any Western system concerning how many subordinates there might be. Rather, this varied from case to case, and often there were no explicit subordinates. In contrast, in Japan we find from the establishment of the first Imperial University an explicit concept of a

²⁴ In all fairness, we must admit that we may be going further in interpreting Shinbori's analysis than he might accept. He may not view these structures as a supplement to bolster the traditional explanation, but rather as the core of that explanation.

²⁵ On the process of adopting the chair in Japan, see Terasaki Masao "Kōzasei' no Rekishiteki

Kenkyū Josetsu—Nihon no Baai (1)" (Historical Review of the Japanese Chair System (1)), *Daigaku Ronshū*, I (1972), pp. 1-10. For a discussion of the chair in Western universities, see Joseph Ben-David, "Universities and Academic Systems in Modern Societies," *European Journal of Sociology* III (1962), pp. 45-84.

hierarchical chair. At the head of this chair was a full professor, and "to assist him in his duties" one assistant professor was authorized. To assist them there could be a lecturer as well as one or two assistants. This 1-1-1-1 ratio at the respective ranks for the chair, or what can be called a linear rank structure, is a Japanese innovation. No other academic system either of that period or today has had such a chair. Furthermore, in the postwar period, operating and research budgets to national universities have been made with the chair as the basic budgetary unit. While Western chairs were not normally organized with fixed ratios between full professors and lower ranking staff, we generally find that the number of full professors at those European institutions which have chairs is usually far less than the number of men at the next lowest rank (and in the U.S., there are more full professors than staff at any lower rank).²⁶

Unfortunately, no one has conducted a thorough investigation of the original records concerning the establishment of Japan's chair system so we do not know why this linear structure was instituted.²⁷ A plausible Japanese reason is that it was preferred as a way to limit competition by virtually guaranteeing a clear line of promotion for those who *got in* at the bottom rung. The problem is that historical records indicate the planners in the Meiji period were actually anxious to stimulate rather than throttle academic competition.²⁸ Only a small number of Japanese nationals were capable of university level scholarship, and possibly this lean linear structure was an adjustment to the shortage of manpower.

It is somewhat easier to explain why lifetime employment and the seniority system were adopted in the Japanese university system. It should be noted that these principles were characteristic of the nineteenth Century French and German civil services including the universities. The early Japanese institution-builders, in their effort to establish a civil service, borrowed the European principles (including permanent employment and seniority). In so far as Japanese national universities were, as in Europe, part of the civil service, these principles were applied in university personnel management as a matter of course. Leaders intent on maintaining continuity with tradition apparently had little influence on these decisions.

The three structures Shinbori mentions surely have an important bearing on behavior in the Japanese academic marketplace. For that matter, in whatever market these structures are found they will have a impact. *But claims about the uniqueness of these structures and of the boss system with its associated norms and patterns of compliance are difficult to maintain as similar structures and patterns are found elsewhere.* In addition, claims about the origins of these structures and patterns in traditional Japanese culture are at best half-truths. Furthermore, in view

²⁶ These differences are made clear in Michiya Shinbori, "Comparative Study of Career Patterns of College Professors," pp. 284-296.

²⁷ The only serious historical investigation of the Japanese chair is Terasaki, *op. cit.* Our comments are based on interviews and inferences from our reading of several of the standard histories of Japanese higher education; of particular interest was Ōkubo Toshiaki, *Nihon no Daigaku* (The Universities of Japan). (Tokyo: Sōgensha, 1943). The question of why these structures were adopted still remains to be investigated. It is important to

recognize that not all universities are organized around the chair; indeed nearly two-thirds are organized around the more flexible course system. See Amano Ikuo, "Kokuritsu Daigaku" (National Universities), in Shimizu Yoshihiro, ed., *Nihon no Kōtō Kyōiku* (Japanese Higher Education) (Tokyo: Daiichi Hōki Shuppan Kabushiki Kaisha, 1968).

²⁸ For some evidence on this point, see Shigeru Nakayama, "The Role Played by Universities in Scientific and Technological Development in Japan," *Journal of World History*, IX (1965), pp. 340-62.

of the responses from the surveys we have reported showing current distaste for these structures (as well as critical pronouncements by influential educational associations), it is clear that these structures no longer have their traditional legitimacy.

Labor Market Approach

The traditional approach is based on assumptions about the uniqueness of Japanese culture from which it attempts to deduce propositions suitable only for explaining Japanese behavior. The alternate labor market approach avoids committing itself to these assumptions and deductions.²⁹

The labor market approach assumes that men, regardless of society, engage in rational decision-making based on their self-interest while the traditional approach views all men as conformists to values prescribed by their respective cultures. The labor market approach incorporates the traditional approach through its recognition that normally it costs less to observe social rules. However, when it is both possible and more profitable to break with tradition the labor market approach assumes this will happen. The labor market approach assumes that men envision alternatives limited only by the information available to them, rather than that they conceive of only the one alternative prescribed by their society. And the labor market framework assumes that men are able to assign relative value to these alternatives and are willing and capable of exerting themselves to achieve those alternatives they value the highest. Finally, the labor market approach assumes that men possess scarce resources which they also value and that they use these resources to achieve their valued alternatives in a satisfying procedure by giving up less in value according to their standards than they receive: in the traditional explanation, men are virtually automatons responding to the commands of their boss and waiting patiently even if they receive little for this obedience. In these and other ways, the two approaches differ in their assumptions.

Labor markets are composed of two groups of actors; employers and employees. Employers command economic resources and other values, and are prepared to exchange these in order to obtain labor—that is, human resources to use in their goal-oriented enterprises.

Employees also have resources, the most important being their labor. They are prepared to surrender this labor in order to obtain economic resources and other values. A market transaction occurs when an employer and an employee agree on the terms for the exchange of their resources—presumably to the advantage of both parties.

Apart from the different assumptions, the major addition of the labor market

²⁹ An important statement of the labor market approach is Simon Rottenberg, "On Choice in Labor Markets," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, IX, 2, (January, 1956), pp. 183-199. The labor market approach has not been applied to the Japanese academic marketplace, though traces of it can be found in policy statements by educational leaders; for example, see Katō Ichirō et al., "Daigaku Kyōkan no Taigū Mondai" (The Problem of the Salaries of University Teachers), *Jurisuto*, No. 356 (Oct. 15, 1966), pp. 78-92. The related approach of social exchange has been used

by Harumi Befu in "Power in the Great White Tower," paper read in "The Ethnography of Power: Oceania and Asia" section of the American Association for Advancement of Science meetings, San Francisco, February 25, 1974. The labor market approach has been used in several attempts to explain behavior in the American academic marketplace; see David G. Brown, *The Mobile Professors* (Washington, D.C.: The American Council on Education, 1967) or Howard D. Marshall, *The Mobility of College Faculties* (New York: Pageant Press, Inc., 1964).

approach is its focus on these transactions. Taking into account the institutional context, the labor market approach attempts to identify the major resources commanded by various actors and their consequences. For some problems, it is possible to develop elaborate models for this purpose. In our case, it will be sufficient to identify the critical resources and their implications for the incidence of mobility-related exchanges. As a first step, we consider the situation of employers in the postwar period.

*The Demand for Scholars*³⁰

Over the postwar period in Japan the size of the academic profession has continually increased, yet in most fields the *aspirants* for the profession have tended to be greater than the number of posts. These trends imply *on balance* that the rewards of academic employment have been greater than that of many other employment possibilities. Thus, employers have been under little pressure to increase the principal reward of the salary in order to attract recruits or to bargain with their employees. Indeed the average salaried income of scholars in Japan is considerably less than would be predicted in view of the profession's high prestige and educational requirements, and this average has increased at a slower rate than most other occupations over the postwar period.³¹

While for the market as a whole employers are in a favorable position, in various sub-sectors they are in need of staff, either to replace old staff or in the case of many recently established institutions to fill new positions. However, there are several features of the marketplace which obstruct an effective expression of this demand.

(1) The recruitment process is customarily "closed" in Japanese higher education.³² By this it is meant that public announcements of vacancies are rarely made. Rather members of institutions seeking candidates engage in a private process of search which is time-consuming, and not guaranteed to uncover all the qualified candidates. Partly due to the closed recruitment system most institutions at any given time have several unfilled positions which they have been unable to find candidates for.

(2) All national universities employ a uniform pay scale, and these universities are unable to offer candidates any more than as prescribed by this uniform scale. Private universities are not bound by this scale, but due to their limited resources and the influence of their staff labor unions the private institutions often use the same salary scale as national universities. In consequence, few universities are able to bargain to any great extent with candidates concerning salary. In addition, bargaining with respect to nonsalary matters is difficult due to the restrictions of bureaucratic regulations. For example, regulations put irrelevant limits on cost of moving allowances and are very strict in granting settling-in allowances. Most of the im-

³⁰ In this and the following section, we will report several empirical generalizations which are documented in Cummings, *Marketplace*, especially Chaps. 3 and 4.

³¹ The discrepancy by a comparison of relative prestige and income of occupations is illustrated in Shigeki Nishihira, "Le Prestige Social des Différentes Professions," *Revue Française de Sociologie*, IX (1968), 555.

³² Degree of openness is a relative matter. The OECD examiners of Japanese education outlined

two Western models of "Open" recruitment and concluded that Japanese universities relied on neither of these, but rather used a closed procedure of "automatic succession within the chair unit" (p. 85). The examiners were speaking of the ideal procedures found in the respective systems, and we feel they overstressed the closedness of the Japanese case. However, the basic contrast along an open—closed dimension seems reasonable. *Reviews of National Policies for Education: Japan* (Paris: OECD, 1971).

portant differences between universities are in unbargainable features such as prestige, quality of staff and students, and location.

(3) With the exception of the rank of assistant in certain university faculties, all academic positions insure permanent tenure. While institutions may wish to hire staff, the lifetime commitment they have to make forces them to be extremely cautious in extending an invitation to a candidate.⁸³

(4) Many of the best institutions are organized around the basic unit of an academic chair. These chairs introduce two important rigidities into the market:

(a) When a member of a chair departs, there is a strong pressure to fill this vacancy from within the institution by promoting a junior man. The result of a chair vacancy is thus likely to be a chain of promotion within the institution, including the offering of an assistantship to one advanced graduate student rather than the recruitment of a candidate from outside.

(b) When an institution has a vacancy in a chair, it is often constrained to choose a candidate whose specialty is identical to that prescribed for the chair even if the institution feels a stronger need for a candidate with a different specialty.

The Supply of Scholars

Also, a number of factors can be identified which restrain the response of Japanese scholars to whatever opportunities for mobility there might be.

(1) As we have observed, the personal obligations that scholars feel to their bosses are not as strong as is normally assumed, yet in most cases these obligations are considerable and in particular instances do prevent scholars from moving.

(2) While Japanese universities offer permanent tenure to their staff, we find that Japanese professors do not feel a reciprocal permanent obligation. However, scholars do feel a limited obligation to stay at an institution for from five to ten years, and are reluctant to consider any offers during this period. Moreover, they recognize the danger of becoming labelled a "butterfly" who flits between too many places.

(3) Japan's scholars have explicit preferences concerning the positions they are prepared to move to. The similarity of these preferences throughout the academic community is remarkable: research conditions are uppermost in importance followed in order by institutional prestige, location, social atmosphere, and other amenities.⁸⁴

⁸³ An adjustment to the staffing problem is the part-time teacher arrangement, especially common in private institutions. Indeed, in some private institutions well over one-third of all classes are taught by part-time teachers. Interestingly, these part-time teachers also have tenure in the sense that once the employing institution hires a teacher it cannot sever its formal tie. But the employer can reduce the number of courses it asks a part-timer to teach (down to none) and the pay which is computed according to the number of hours in the classroom.

⁸⁴ The obvious reason for this undifferentiated picture of an ideal working place is that most young scholars were trained at former imperial universities by professors who likewise were trained at these institutions. All of the imperial universities

were designed according to a common plan and with a common Germanic view of academic work; furthermore these former imperial universities where most scholars spent their formative years had all of the desired attributes—the best research conditions, prestige, and location.

Private institutions train only a small proportion of graduate students, but we do find greater variation in the preference orders of these students. A greater proportion give high preference ranking to such attributes as cordiality of colleagues, tradition, and student spirit which we have included in the category of social atmosphere. Nevertheless, the overall preference order among private university professors is not very different from that of national university professors simply because the vast majority were trained at national universities.

Older scholars place emphasis on prestige relative to research conditions, but generally this preference order holds across the academic community. The features of universities that scholars value most are those that are scarcest, being found only at the great universities. In the Japanese system, there is a sharp gradient with most lesser quality institutions being poorly endowed with these preferred characteristics. Thus most scholars are prepared to move to the best universities, but have not considered other alternatives.

(4) The retirement benefit systems of different sectors of the marketplace are exclusive. The major gap is between private and national-public institutions: within the private sector, there are further sub-sectors. Scholars who move from one of these sectors to another usually have to sacrifice years of tenure they have incurred towards eligibility for retirement benefits, as the respective schemes are managed by different insurance firms. Furthermore, if they move into the national sector with less than twenty years remaining prior to mandatory retirement or into the major private sectors with less than seventeen years, they will not be entitled to full pension benefits. Naturally men considering mobility are wary of these heavy potential costs. The result is that most mobility is within the respective sectors, and very little occurs between.³⁵

(5) Long-distance movement involves many other sacrifices for scholars, and usually there is no immediate indication that they will be able to recover these losses. For example, most scholars who work in one location for a period of time develop a web of consulting, publication, and other remunerative relations. If they move a long-distance, these relations will have to be given up. Long-distance movement also entails selling a home if the mobile scholar owns one and purchasing a new residence, a set of transactions which is especially time-consuming and financially unpredictable in Japan. Finally, the children of scholars will find it necessary to make new friends and transfer to an unfamiliar and possibly inferior school. The visible costs of long distance mobility are great, and thus not surprisingly the vast majority of inter-university moves in Japan involve nothing more than a shift between two institutions within commuting distance of the mobile scholar's home.

American Comparison

Taking all of these factors into consideration we find that Japan has a number of strong impediments to mobility. We do not have rigorous comparative data for European systems, but several studies of American marketplaces enable us to make comparisons with respect to those factors affecting supply and demand. Concerning demand, the most important difference is that the American academic marketplace has been a supplier's market over most of the postwar period in most fields. Moreover, in the U.S. university salary levels have not only risen faster than in many other occupations but have continued to evidence wide differentials by field, location, institution and individual. Recruitment in the American market is more open than in Japan. Also in the American system, academic chairs are rare and are not so rigidly

³⁵ The one obvious exception is the distinguished professor of a national university who moves *amakudari* style to a private university at the zenith of his career and after he has served long enough to gain the full retirement benefits. It is of interest

that moves of this kind are less than 10 per cent of all moves each year, despite the claims of some observers that these post-retirement moves constitute virtually the only form of mobility in Japanese academia.

specified that they seriously limit an institution's freedom when recruiting. On the supply side, we find that American scholars are not expected to feel strong obligations to their chief professors nor to their employing institutions and evidence much greater variety in their preferences for workplace conditions. For instance, many American scholars actually prefer a setting other than the large American graduate school university exemplified by Harvard and Berkeley, whereas most Japanese scholars look only to the Universities of Tokyo, Kyoto, Keiō and Waseda (and possibly five other institutions) as ideal workplaces. Also, in the American system, a common national system of pensions (TIAA-CREF) and flexible provisions of compensation for mobility costs enable scholars to respond readily to opportunity.

In view of these differences, it is not surprising that mobility is more common in the U.S. than in Japan. The challenge for comparative research is to investigate how Japan and the U.S. stand relative to the various European systems in terms of these supply and demand factors. Our expectation is that these European systems will in many respects more closely resemble the Japanese situation. One major similarity is that the national sector in most European systems is dominant with the result that salary schedules, pensions, the establishment of posts and other practices are as bureaucratized as in Japan. A major difference is that European systems are beginning to rapidly increase in size and thus shift from demanders to suppliers' markets, whereas Japan has already passed through this phase and returned to a demanders' market. Also, in Europe religious and ethnic affiliations tend to balkanize markets as between the Flemish and French in Belgium, whereas Japan does not have these barriers—though the public/private university differentiation has similar overtones.

The Changing Marketplace

An important test of an explanatory framework's usefulness is its capacity to account for changes in behavior over time. The traditional framework identifies aspects of Japanese culture and social structure which are said to be unchanging. In contrast, the labor market framework focusses on factors affecting the demand for and supply of scholars which are likely to change. And to the extent that these change it predicts there will be changes in marketplace behavior. In our initial application of the labor market framework, we have assumed that the several independent variables were relatively stable over the careers of the representative sample, and on balance operated to restrain mobility. If we take a longer time period reaching back to the prewar period, it is necessary to alter this assumption. Indeed, in the prewar period, several of the factors, especially on the demand side, were more favorable to mobility.

The number of prewar institutions providing graduate training was far less than today, and they allowed only a small minority of their students to pursue graduate studies. Due to this selectivity, the recruits were few in number and well-trained. In most fields, there was a shortage of manpower, and thus the average salary for scholars was exceedingly high. In the Meiji period, the income of full professors was 25 times that of estimated average family consumption, and as late as 1935 it was between 1.5 to three times as great, whereas today it is only one and one-third times as great (see Table 4). More importantly, there was greater flexibility and diversity in the amounts paid to scholars. While all national universities used a common pay system, this system placed somewhat less emphasis on the ascriptive criteria of

TABLE 4—TRENDS IN PURCHASING POWER OF JAPANESE TEACHERS RELATIVE TO ESTIMATED AVERAGE FAMILY CONSUMPTION

Salary Statistics	Year			
	1935	1951	1961	1965
1. Average Annual Salary of Public Primary School Teachers* (A)	¥307,588	¥233,733	¥562,907	¥785,737
2. Average Annual Salary of Public Higher Education Teachers* (B)	893,281	499,793	858,089	978,825
3. Average Annual Salary of Private Higher Education Teachers* (C)	400,876	606,243	604,074	930,792
4. National Per Capita Personal Consumption* (D)	68,646	53,532	128,734	178,473
5. Estimated Consumption for Average Family of Four (D × 4)	276,584	214,128	516,936	713,892
6. Relative Purchasing Power of Primary School Teacher (A/D × 4)	1.11	1.09	1.09	1.10
7. Relative Purchasing Power of Public Higher Education Teacher (B/D × 4)	3.25	2.33	1.67	1.37
8. Relative Purchasing Power of Private Higher Education Teacher (C/D × 4)	1.46	2.83	1.17	1.31

Source: Chūō Kyōiku Shingikai, *Wagakuni no Kyōiku no Ayumi to Kōgō no Kadai—Chūō Kyōiku Shingikai Chūkan Hōkoku* (Empirical Studies on Aspects of Our Nation's Education—Supplementary Documents to the Interim Report of the Central Education Council), Tokyo, Ōkurashō Insatsukyoku, 1969, p. 440.

Notes: * = 1965 prices.

age than the present one. Rather it recognized achievements such as an individual's attainment of an advanced degree, the official status of his institution, his academic rank, and in addition there were discriminations according to his performance as judged by the dean of his faculty and others. For example, there were six different levels of pay that could be offered to full professors at an Imperial University according to a dean's discretion. Also, between national and private institutions, there was great diversity with some private institutions actually being able to offer more than national universities and others much less. The overall flexibility in the pay system of this earlier period provided universities with more bargaining issues than has been the case for most of the postwar period.

On the supply side were several other differences more favorable to mobility than today. For example, the retirement benefits system had not been instituted, and the retirement bonus system was much more flexible—partly because salary scales were much higher and there was no mandatory retirement age. The higher income of scholars made them less dependent on extra-work for their livelihood, and thus less bound to the particular locales where they were accustomed to picking up this extra-work. Also, long distance mobility was made easier by more generous "special allowances" and frequent assistance in housing. The concern of scholars who moved to remote places with the quality of education their children received was probably less, as the national government maintained a relatively even standard across the

nation (at least at the middle and higher school levels) and the competition for entrance to good schools and universities was less severe; in any case, sending children to Tokyo for their secondary and higher education was within the means of most scholars. Also, young scholars of the prewar period were less research-oriented (or at least less oriented to the kinds of research which require large laboratories and libraries as are many of today's scholars who consequently are anchored to the metropolis and its superior research conditions) and more receptive to arguments that a trip to the periphery would strengthen the nation—indeed even the national universities established in the remote colonies (Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria) were able to recruit competent Japanese staff.

Finally, a young scholar's sense of obligation to his boss was probably stronger in the prewar period, and according to the traditional explanation this would have acted as a restraint on mobility. However, we expect that prewar bosses had less need than their postwar counterparts to control the location that their disciples worked at. Elsewhere, we have argued that the principle motivations that bosses have for maintaining academic cliques are a sense of moral obligation to look after their students and a desire for cheap labor to conduct large research projects. The relative infrequency of "Big Science" along with the superior funding at universities enabled prewar bosses to solve many of their research problems without heavily exploiting their disciples.

Taking these various differences into account, we are persuaded that mid-career mobility in the prewar period was both easier (supply) and more desired (demand). Unfortunately we have no way to directly measure mobility rates in the two periods. However, drawing on the work histories of our 1967 general sample, we can make an indirect assessment by comparing the proportion of *status changes* in the two periods which involved movement between two institutions as in Table 5.⁸⁶ A status change is any alteration in academic rank and/or workplace of a scholar; we have divided the status changes into those that were completed before the end of World War II, those where the prior status was in the old system and the new status in the new system (most of these occurred between 1945 and 1952), and those which involved both a prior and new status in the new system. A scholar's first status change is when he assumes his first job and it is interesting that roughly the same proportion of those who finished their study took up their first job at a new institution other than their place of study; slightly more of those making this move in the transition period assumed their first job at an institution other than their place of study. *Where the old system and new system significantly differ is in change of status after the first job.* Only about one third of the changes of status after the first teaching job in the new system involved movement to a new institution. On the other hand, over half of the changes in the old system involved movement to a new institution; once again, during the transition period, the likelihood of change of place accompanying change of status was the highest. The conclusion is that mobility was most likely in the brief

⁸⁶ As our sample ranges in age from several scholars in their late twenties to a few over seventy, some will wonder if the temporal comparisons in the text are valid. What we concentrate on in the comparisons are experiences common to all scholars whether young or old—i.e., securing their first job and then the first two status changes after that.

Nearly all of the scholars in our sample were old enough to have had that much career change. The youngest in our sample tend not to have more than two or three status changes, and our argument does not depend on what happens in the advanced stages of the careers of scholars in either the prewar or postwar period.

TABLE 5—PROPORTION OF STATUS-CHANGES THAT INVOLVE CHANGE OF PLACE

Changes of Status	Period Changes Occurred In												Total
	Old System				Old-New System				New System				
	Total Status Change	No. to New Place	% to New Place	Total Status Change	No. to New Place	% to New Place	Total Status Change	No. to New Place	% to New Place	Total Status Change	No. to New Place	% to New Place	
Study Place to First Job	173	109	63.0%	158	110	69.6%	447	264	59.1%	778	483	62.1%	
Status-Changes in Teaching Career:													
First to Second	74	44	59.5%	94	57	60.6%	464	160	34.5%	632	261	41.3%	
Second to Third	30	13	43.3%	38	23	60.5%	311	101	32.5%	379	137	36.1%	
Third to Fourth	9	2	22.2%	12	6	50.0%	110	50	45.5%	131	58	44.3%	
Later Changes	4	1	25.0%	2	2	100.0%	39	21	53.8%	45	24	53.3%	
Total Changes in Teaching Career	117	60	51.3%	146	88	60.3%	924	332	35.9%	1187	480	40.4%	

Source: 1967 Representative Study

period when the American occupation promoted a major structural transformation of Japanese higher education, it was next most likely on the old system, and by far least likely in the post-war period. The prediction that mobility would be higher in the prewar period is confirmed.³⁷

Inbreeding

The professors at Japan's leading national universities feel confident that an exceptional group of youths are studying in their undergraduate faculties: these youths have succeeded in a nationwide entrance-exam competition, and are obviously bright. These same institutions are the principal centers of graduate education, and they select by competitive examinations some of the finest products of their undergraduate faculties along with capable students from other institutions. Over the postwar period, Tokyo University has granted 14 per cent of all doctorates in Japan, and 13 per cent of all masters. The respective figures for Kyoto University are 10 and 8 per cent. Tokyo University has trained one fifth of all scholars presently employed in Japanese universities. And this university along with five others has trained nearly three-fifths of all scholars.³⁸

These leading national universities receive the cream of the crop in their graduate schools, and hence it is not surprising that the majority of the staff they employ are chosen from this group. On the supply side, most of the former students consider it an honor to be invited to their alma mater; moreover, relative to most alternatives, their alma mater provides them with adequate research facilities. Thus, former students are often prepared to join their alma mater even at some sacrifice in terms of speed of promotion or salary. From the point of view of the employer then, alumni are often cheaper to hire than outsiders.

On the demand side, the leading universities are looking for someone who will fit in both personally and academically. Having had several years during the course of training with which to become acquainted with former students, it is easy for the university to make judgments on their personality whereas there is little information on the graduates of other universities. Also former students often have obligations to one or more of their professors. These personal debts become levers on the side of the university for controlling inbred faculty in times of crisis (a real consideration given the turmoil that has frequently enveloped Japanese universities); the university lacks a similar mechanism for reaching faculty who have come from outside their interpersonal network. Finally, inbred faculty are likely to be more loyal to the institution and thus to more readily reject competitive offers from other institutions; to the extent that they do reject offers, the university is saved the trouble and expense of hunting for a replacement.

In the early decades of their establishment, the leading institutions could not meet

³⁷ We also investigated the careers of elite scholars sampled from the 1937 *Jinji Kōshinroku*. Comparisons of their careers with those of the postwar sample reported in Table 2 above indicated that the prewar elite scholars had been less mobile. As earlier noted, the conditions affecting the careers of elite scholars are different than those affecting ordinary scholars. In particular, elite scholars in the prewar period were less dispensable at their places of employment as they were fewer in number and had much greater responsibility in

education and administration. While the general demand for academic talent was stronger in that period (greater elasticity as well), the elite scholars had to forego opportunities due to their moral obligations to their employing institutions; see Cummings, *Marketplace*, pp. 168ff.

³⁸ The statistics are reported in Cummings, *Marketplace*, pp. 367ff. The five other institutions following the University of Tokyo are Kyoto, Tōhoku, Tokyo Kyōiku, Kyūshū, and Hokkaidō.

all of their staff needs with former students, and thus tended to recruit a large proportion of staff from foreign institutions or their domestic competitors. However, with each successive decade their level of inbreeding has increased.³⁹

While the economic and integrative benefits of inbreeding are important, it would be wrong to think that inbreeding is antithetical to quality scholarship. Before selecting former students, universities have a considerable period to observe their academic performance. The students write Masters' papers; in the natural sciences including medicine and in some of the social sciences they also write Ph.D. dissertations. Moreover, the students usually publish articles while in graduate school and many departments have formal committees to appraise the quality of these articles and award prizes. Unless a prospect has a good record in his published work, it is difficult for him to gain employment at his alma mater; few chief professors would support a student without such a record and those who did would not be listened to. The deciding vote on personnel decisions is by the faculty meeting.

Once a former student is employed, there is always the possibility that he will reduce his effort. While there are many cases of sloth and deadwood among inbred Japanese scholars, there is no evidence that the incidence is any lower among those scholars hired from outside.⁴⁰ Unlike the lesser universities, many of the institutions which rely on heavy inbreeding guard themselves against this last possibility by first hiring their former students as assistants on a term contract and then deciding at the conclusion of this contract whether to send these students up or out. Thus, it can be seen that there are many economic and other benefits to inbreeding both on the part of the leading universities and their alumni. It is not surprising that Japan's leading universities are inbred; nor is it surprising that the leading universities of all major university systems are extensively inbred, even if not to the Japanese extreme.

Given the centralization of graduate training in Japan, the incidence of so-called colonization is also not surprising. By colonization is meant the practice of a leading university or some part of that university to secure a nearly exclusive right to supply scholars to a second university. On the side of supply, many young scholars will be happy to go to an institution linked to their alma mater if such a move will enhance their visibility. From the side of demand, the colonized universities can hope to get preferred treatment from their patrons, and they probably experience less need to bargain with candidates supplied by patrons than they would with candidates that come unsponsored. Only as patrons begin to fail in supplying good recruits might a colony begin to question the value of its restricted market position. While it is impossible to know how frequent formal colonial relations are, it is pertinent to note that in 1970 over half the faculty in 31 of Japan's universities (total of 373 four-year universities for which data is available) had been supplied by a single other graduate school; an additional 97 had from 30-50 per cent from a single institution.⁴¹

The handful of leading universities are slipping in their dominance as trainers

³⁹ See Footnote 19.

⁴⁰ Despite two reviews of the evidence, there is no clear finding on the consequences of inbreeding in Japan; see Michiya Shinbori, "The Academic Marketplace in Japan," *The Developing Economies*, VII, 4 (December, 1969), pp. 637ff.; and Cummings, *Marketplace*, pp. 340-347. Lowell L. Hargens and Grant M. Farr after a careful analysis applying controls for prestige of current depart-

ment and year of Ph.D. conclude that inbred scientists "tend to be slightly less productive in terms of quantity and quality of publications than their non-inbred colleagues" in "An Examination of Recent Hypotheses About Institutional Inbreeding," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 78, No. 6 (May, 1973), p. 1393.

⁴¹ Cummings, *Marketplace*, p. 154.

of graduate students due to competition in the large number of new graduate schools. But most lesser institutions put first priority on recruiting from these traditional leaders in graduate training. The principal exceptions are the leading private institutions such as Keiō and Waseda which have long prided themselves on their autonomy from the national system. Rather than take the second-best students from the graduate schools of leading national universities, they prefer to train their own staff. These institutions have large undergraduate enrollments, and among these masses are a small group of exceptionally able students. As the number of first-rate students is small and graduate education is expensive, the leading private institutions limit the size of their graduate schools. And before appointing a prize student to a faculty position, the private institutions will test this student for a long period: they may first make him an assistant or a teacher at an affiliated secondary school and possibly send him overseas for a period of exposure to a Western graduate school. After the student demonstrates sustained capacity to meet these challenges, he may be given a faculty appointment. The small number of students that the leading private institutions select for graduate training sharply curtails their capacity to "colonize" lesser institutions, but not to inbreed their own faculties.

Mobility by Quality Level

Earlier in this essay, we noted that the careers of Japan's elite scholars are less diverse than those of the average scholars. Thus, we are not surprised to find when in Table 6 we split our Representative Sample of scholars into three groups according to the quality of their present institution that those at the highest quality institutions have less diverse careers than those at the better than average and average quality

TABLE 6—INDICATORS OF FEATURES OF CAREER BY QUALITY OF UNIVERSITY

Indicators	University Quality			Total
	High	Beter Than Average	Average	
Proportion Now Working at Institution Where They Received Some Training	77.0%	14.3%	13.7%	34.2%
Proportion Pure Inbred (Graduate Training and All Teaching Same)	56.2%	13.0%	10.5%	25.7%
Proportion Who Have Worked at More Than One University	31.0%	39.0%	44.3%	38.1%
Proportion Who Have Worked Outside of Higher Education	36.6%	43.8%	46.3%	42.3%
Average Number of Higher Educational Workplaces	1.56	1.59	1.78	1.64
Average Number of Non-University Workplaces	.41	.54	.62	.53

Source: 1967 Representative Study

institutions.⁴² From what we have said about inbreeding, it should be clear why professors at high quality institutions are likely to have studied at fewer institutions. Also, it should be obvious that lower quality institutions, often having been established for a short period and involved with expansion plans, would find it necessary to recruit a relatively larger number of their staff from non-university workplaces.

The one statistic that requires a special note is the higher rate of mobility between institutions for the scholars at the lower quality institutions; the trend of higher rates of mobility at better than average and average quality institutions would be even more marked if we adjusted for the differences in age distributions. The traditional approach would actually predict an opposite trend: scholars feeling obligations to their boss and their employing institutions would not move unless asked by their boss to shift from their initial first university to a second which would typically be better and possibly even their alma mater. Thus, the traditional approach would predict largely one-way mobility from lower to higher quality institutions; the scholars found at lesser institutions would tend to be at their initial workplace and those at the better institutions having worked their way up the ladder would presumably have more diverse careers.

Using our labor market framework, we can appreciate that the lower quality institutions are in greater need of scholars and not being able to offer the non-monetary incentive of prestige make efforts through more visible incentives to attract staff. We found that the personnel policies at many of the better than average and average quality institutions are more imaginative, and that bargaining is much more common in recruitment, especially in the private sector. Also, the salary spread is wider at private institutions reflecting their willingness to manipulate "rules" if it increases their chances for a good catch.

The recruitment energy of the lesser institutions enables them to attract leading scholars from major institutions at the point of retirement to come down from heaven (*amakudari*); more importantly, there are with increasing frequency instances where well-known scholars (in the middle years of their career) move "down" from traditionally high-status institutions to accept more attractive positions in terms of salary, working conditions, and other benefits. Until recently this downward movement of stars occurred largely in the humanities and social sciences; however, in the past few years six new medical and dental universities have been established by private groups and these have been successful in attracting outstanding researchers in mid-career through promising them both good salaries and customized research laboratories. The Japanese pattern of the downward movement of stars is of considerable interest as in the American marketplace the pattern until most recently has been of movement towards and between the top ranking institutions. However, lately there are signs of a more Japanese pattern in the U.S. as many of the lesser institutions gain new revenues and attempt to boost their images.

⁴² We used the following pieces of information to construct a quantitative index of "quality": whether the institution had trained a large number of scholars or not, whether it had university status before World War II or not, whether it has a graduate school or not, whether it has affiliated research institutes or not, its student-teacher ratio, and finally the extent to which it attracts students from across the nation. Details are presented in Appendix 3 of Cummings, *Marketplace*.

Conclusion

Our primary concern has been to counter many of the extreme claims about the Japanese case. Traditional explanations highlight the special institutional character of Japanese marketplaces, but prove to be too inflexible to account for many of the variations in behavior of these marketplaces. To provide a superior explanation of these variations, we have introduced the labor market approach. This approach has proved to be useful in accounting for the somewhat low incidence of mobility among Japanese scholars, the variations in movement and rates of inbreeding by quality level, and for changes over time. In a larger study, variations by academic field were also considered.

Reliance on the labor market approach has required us to consider many questions that were slighted in previous studies—though for lack of adequate data we have not been able to resolve all of these to our satisfaction. One set of questions concerns the effect on the marketplace of changing contextual factors such as scale, revenues, and regulations. Our conclusion is that the various contextual factors of the Japanese marketplace make it less dynamic than the American marketplace. However, we noted several signs that this situation may be changing. While the scale and revenues of American higher education may be approaching a point of relative stability, in Japan we can anticipate further increases in revenues and scale over the near future; moreover, in Japan many regulations of academic employment which in the past tended to restrain mobility are undergoing reform. Changes in contextual factors are likely to be even more dramatic in several of the European university systems. It will be interesting to compare these marketplaces over the coming years. Will the American marketplace become relatively stagnant and American universities more inbred while the overseas competitors become more dynamic? And with what consequences? It is quite possible that our images of different academic systems will undergo dramatic changes in the decades to come.